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Nuclear Fallout

Reevaluating the Ethics and Efficacy of Military Deterrence

by Mark DeYoung

In early 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis threatened the world with nuclear holocaust, famous British philosopher and historian Bertrand Russell wrote a letter to an Israeli newspaper. He drew scathing parallels between Nazism’s worst evils and that of the East-West policy of nuclear deterrence.

“Nuclear policy is based on the willingness to commit genocide,” he wrote. “Every individual who accepts such a policy or allows it to continue without personal protest is assuming the role of Adolf Eichmann (the Nazi officer often referred to as the ‘architect of the Holocaust’).”

Today, deterrence is still the core philosophy that justifies the stockpiling, testing and potential use of nuclear weapons. With the U.S. and Russia signing the first nuclear arms treaty in more than two decades, and with Obama laying out some new nuclear policy goals, it is important to reevaluate the use of nuclear weapons from the standpoint of military effectiveness and, as Catholics, moral justification.

In essence, nuclear deterrence rests on the idea of mutually assured destruction. Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense under Kennedy and Johnson) put it quite directly: “It is important to understand that assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept. We must possess an actual assured-destruction capability, and that capability also must be credible.”

But what does this mean in actuality? If a nuclear state holds a policy of deterrence, it must be willing to kill thousands (perhaps millions) of innocent people when their nuclear counterparts lash out. A nuclear state must be willing and able to incinerate entire populations of living, breathing non-combatant human beings.

Is such a policy morally justifiable?

“What can be said ... about those governments which count on nuclear arms as a means of ensuring the security of their countries?” stated Pope Benedict in a World Day of Peace Message. “Along with countless persons of good will, one can state that this point of view is not only baneful but also completely fallacious. In a nuclear war there would be no victors, only victims.”

Twenty years earlier, Pope John Paul II delivered to the UN General Assembly a somewhat more ambiguous message on the morality of nuclear weapons.

“In current conditions deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable,” he said. “Nonetheless in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion.”

Many proponents of nuclear weapons have used this statement to justify a continuing framework of deterrence, while opponents say that the former pope only reluctantly accepted it, and only if it was part of a larger campaign of disarmament.

In the ‘80s, during the height of the Cold War, the American bishops put out a pastoral letter on the nuclear dilemma, applying two just war concepts to the question: proportionality and discrimination. Proportionality refers to the military advantage that can be obtained from a specific action, weighed against the expected damage it will cause. Discrimination addresses the ability of a military force to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, seeking to ensure that all action is directed toward the former. When it came to counter-population strikes (which nuclear deterrence, by definition, threatens), the bishops could find no moral justification and ruled them neither proportionate nor discriminate. Nuclear strikes by their nature target noncombatants and the long term effects of lingering radiation make it difficult to justify proportionality.

“No Christian can rightfully carry out orders or policies deliberately aimed at killing noncombatants,” they concluded.

Some strategists argue that nukes can be morally justified when targeting (non-civilian) military, government and economic targets. However, conventional weaponry proves more than efficient in this regard, and nuclear weapons require destruction of areas much larger than just the target, ensuring civilian deaths. Is it justifiable to destroy an entire section of a city to take out one government building?

And what about the effectiveness question? Are deterrence and the threat of massive nuclear counterstrikes a solid strategy?

The horrific bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which took more than 200,000 lives, are cited as strong examples of the strategic effectiveness of nuclear force. Yet, increasingly, the newest generation of historians suggest that the Japanese surrender was largely the result of the Soviet invasion and declaration of war. Emperor Hirohito, speaking to his military commanders at the time, cited the Soviet invasion as the sole reason for ending the war.

Historically, there is no precedent to suggest that targeting civilian populations is an effective strategy to end conflict.

During World War II, 60,000 people died in the United Kingdom as a result of the bombing of cities. Yet England neither surrendered nor seriously considered surrendering. Members of the Parliament never even urged such an action of surrender following the bombings. Likewise, Russia and China sustained massive civilian casualties during WWII, yet neither gave in.

During the Thirty Years War, more than 20 percent of German civilians lost their lives. Yet that war carried on.

Between 1943 and 1945 Allied forces destroyed numerous German cities, and sixty-six Japanese cities were hammered with conventional bombs in the summer of 1945, yet those actions did not result in either country raising the white flag.

In the war fought between Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay in the 19th Century, more than half of the Paraguayan civilian population was killed in less than five years, yet the military leaders did not deem this sufficient reason to capitulate.

In a similar vein, having access to nuclear stockpiles also does not appear to preclude military engagement. Simply look at the numerous military conflicts that nuclear powers have been drawn into despite their recourse to nuclear force. The United States, Russia, Israel, Pakistan, India and England all provide a plethora of examples.

Based on historical evidence and the application of some just war concepts, it appears that the creation, maintenance and use of nuclear weapons is neither morally justifiable nor militarily effective. And while strategists may have many strong arguments for nuclear deterrence, the moral reasoning remains the same. The ends never justify the means.

For President Obama, creating a world without nuclear weapons is the “core challenge of the 21st century.” The signing of the nuclear reduction treaty with Russia and the administration’s Nuclear Policy Review are a good first start. All people of good will, and especially all Catholics who adhere to the Church’s just war policy, should support him in his endeavors to move towards a nuclear-free world.

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(The views expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Headline Bistro or the Knights of Columbus.)